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Introduction 
 
Due to the drastic slow-down of African economic growth, various social, 
economic, and political problems concealed by high growth since the beginning of the 21st 
century have once again started to garner keen attention. These include unemployment 
and underemployment (especially among youth), widening socio-economic inequality, de-
industrialization or relative stagnation of the industrial sector, and destabilization 
associated with violence and conflicts often waged between ethnic groups. 
It is important to recognize that these problems associated with growth in Africa 
are closely intertwined and this will be elaborated in the first section. The slow growth 
seen in the industrial sector, is apparently due to ‘the syndrome of the missing middle,’ 
where a small number of large formal enterprises and a few middle-sized formal ones co-
exist with numerous informal micro and small enterprises which seldom grow in size,  
(see World Bank 1989; McCormick 1992, 1993, 1999; Sleuwaegen and Goedhuys 2002; 
Gelb et al. 2014)1. Large enterprises do not have very strong absorptive capacities for 
labor, often due to their high capital-intensiveness (or imported-technology-
intensiveness) whereas micro and small enterprises, which are mostly based on 
indigenous or easily acquired technologies, provide vast but unstable employment 
opportunities (Hart 1973). After the International Labour Organization (ILO) issued its 
revolutionary report on the informal sector in Africa in 1972 (ILO1972), views on the 
importance and vibrancy of the sector became well recognized. However, it remains true 
that informality continues to constrain the growth of micro and small enterprises since 
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legal protection for contracts with governments and private entities, and access to formal 
services such as credit from commercial banks and other service providers is limited 
(World Bank 1989). Moreover, the fact that numerous enterprises stay tiny and informal 
implies that they cannot exploit the merits of organized and thus efficient production to 
enjoy economies of scale. This missing middle syndrome is associated with income and 
asset inequality between stakeholders of large enterprises on the one hand, and those 
engaged in the micro and small enterprises and the unemployed and underemployed on 
the other hand. Such a situation is an important aspect in the stagnation of African 
industry. Overall, formalization, most often in the form of corporatization of micro and 
small enterprises leading to steady growth, is much desired. Nevertheless, we should 
take account of rationality of micro and small enterprises staying informal: procedures 
for formalization corporatization are too cumbersome (World Bank 1989); regulations 
and taxation seem to them too burdensome; investment in expansion and formalization 
will possibly carry too high risks (McCormick 1992 and 1993).  
Compounding these difficulties are ethnic and other socio-cultural cleavages 
associated with the missing middle syndrome and overall income inequality. In some 
African countries, large firms are apparently controlled by particular ethnic groups, 
while other groups are often excluded. It seemingly leads to horizontal or inter-ethnic 
inequality, which has been indicated as a major cause for enmity and conflicts between 
ethnic groups (Stewart eds. 2008). Overall, the said difficult problems in Africa, socio-
economic inequality and lack of employment, the missing middle syndrome and 
stagnation of industries, and inter-ethnic enmity and conflicts, are interrelated with 
each other, forming the nexus of the problems. 
 We, however, have to notice a new policy initiative and phenomenon connected 
with it in Africa. There have been efforts by governments, aid organizations, and some 
NGOs to strengthen human resources through vocational, skill, and managerial 
trainings and promote development and formalization (or corporatization) of micro and 
small industrial enterprises. What is an important fact is that these efforts are not 
totally abortive and have apparently resulted in successes, if not often. An example is 
the case in the Kenyan road construction sector. In the Kenyan case which this present 
paper discusses, some construction companies which have been newly corporatized 
companies equipped with members’ newly acquired skills originated from self-help 
groups under circumstances where multi-ethnic composition in each group has been 
encouraged after a large-scale inter-ethnic conflict called the Post-Election Violence 
(PEV). The case of those successfully developing construction companies would naturally 
induce us to expect they could be vehicles for a solution, even if small, for the above-
mentioned nexus of the problems. Development of multi-ethnic corporations which have 
risen from grassroots, through filling the missing middle, could lead to not only reversal 
of de-industrialization but also reduction of socio-economic inequality and bridging 
between ethnic groups once opposing each other. 
This paper aims at examining whether such expectations of ours are correct in 
the reality of the post-PEV Kenya. In this paper, the first section draws on relevant 
literature and explains the background related to a case of development and 
corporatization of small road construction firms in an area ridden by the PEV, namely, 
Uasin Gishu county2 (see Map 1). The situation in the county (then district) at the time 
of the PEV was a typical example of the nexus of problems. On the basis of this 
background the section finally presents the research questions this study seeks to 
answer. In the second section, interventions undertaken by an international NGO and 
the Kenyan government are introduced. The NGO worked to transfer a modality of labor-
based technology, called the Do-nou technology, and encouraging Kenyan beneficiaries 
to form multi-ethnic self-help groups after the PEV. Also, it technically and financially 
collaborated with a training institute of the Kenyan government to advance skills and 
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know-how of members of self-help groups and help them corporatize their groups as 
formal road construction firms. The section three presents methodologies and results of 
this author’s research based on interviews with beneficiaries of the NGO supports who 
experienced the training at the government institutes. The section four discusses 
whether our expectations are correct in the reality in Uasin Gishu. The final section 
(Conclusion) summarizes findings and arguments of the paper and presents future 
direction of studies required to complement limitations of the author’s research. 
 
Map 1 Uasin Gishu county (district) in Kenya 
Courtesy: Karte: NordNordWest, Lizenz: Creative Commons by-sa-3.0 de, CC BY-SA 
3.0 de, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=38844206 
 
1. Background of the Study: A Case of the Nexus of Problems in Uasin Gishu, Kenya 
1.1. The nexus of problems in Africa 
As Gelb et al. [2014] suggested with regard to ‘the missing middle’ syndrome, 
complex structural connections between various political, social, and economic problems 
in Africa are a result of Africa’s unique politico-economic history which includes the 
colonial period. While it may seem that the widening socio-economic inequalities in 
African countries were caused by the high economic growth which began at the beginning 
of the 21st century, inequality has long been a problem in a number of African countries. 
Generally speaking, socio-economic inequalities are very likely connected with 
the following factors: distribution of production means (physical capital, land, etc.); 
access to resources from government, formal institutions, and foreign aid; human capital 
(knowledge, skills, and technology); geographical/climate advantages; and livelihoods or 
occupations.  
In Sub-Saharan Africa, the state, for the most part, was exogenously formulated 
through colonial division. The governance structure of each colonial state was imposed 
by colonial rulers. In addition, though the situation varies from region to region, the 
market system was far less developed than on other continents largely due to adverse 
natural conditions and low population density. Market oriented activities such as cash 
crop production and manufacturing were often of limited scale, and services, therefore, 
were to a large extent introduced by colonial rulers. Thus, a larger proportion of economic 
and social interests were created or fostered by the colonial state. This led to the 
formulation of an economic structure in which highly productive enterprises, applying 
modern technology, coexist with numerous micro and small economic entities with 
conventional production technology. This is the historical origin of the missing middle 
4 
 
syndrome (Gelb et al. 2014). 
After independence, state power was, in most cases, seized by a group of African 
elites. Of  significance to our study is the fact that the ethnic composition of the new 
African elites was often very different from that of total population. During the colonial 
period certain ethnic groups were more educated, and developed closer contacts with the 
state and market economy than others. Therefore, they generated a larger number of 
political and economic elites than other groups. These first-generation elites, mostly 
educated in the language of the colonial rulers, eventually led the liberation movements 
and took the initiative in negotiations with colonial powers for independence. These 
liberation leaders, in many cases, became the ruling elite of the newly independent 
countries, and their ethnicity was often not proportionate to that of the general 
population. In many cases minority ethnic groups represented by their elites in the new 
independent governments, had more influence and access to economic interests 
previously created and controlled by the colonial state than others. While the new 
African elites, by means of their influence, sought to capture and increase their own 
interests, they also tended to favor their own ethnic groups through public resource 
distribution including the development of socio-economic infrastructure such as schools, 
roads, clinics, and so on.  
In another way, this ethnically-biased elite capture of state resources led to 
collusion between the government and state-owned enterprises and heavily-protected 
large corporations, often affiliated with multi-national corporations. Biased advantages 
inclined to those large formal enterprises, leaving micro and small enterprises to engage 
in local economic activities which a number of ordinary people engaged in but stayed 
informal. Thus the dualist economic structure of colonial origin was maintained. The 
ethnically based elite-capture reinforced the missing middle syndrome. Subsidy and 
protection by the government seldom resulted in accelerated industrialization but rather 
caused inefficiency and said de-industrialization.  
On the other hand the capture by elites led to aggravation of horizontal or inter-
ethnic inequality and grudges on the side of disadvantaged ethnic groups, resulting in 
inter-ethnic competition, enmity, and conflicts. 
From this we can see the historical formulation process of the said nexus of 
problems in independent Africa: linkage between stagnation of industrialization, the 
missing middle syndrome, inter-ethnic inequality and rivalry. 
 
1.2  Formulation of the nexus of problems in Kenya 
 Kenya, although a typical African country, has a nexus of problems but with 
some unique attributes. During the colonial period, a small population of European 
settlers seized fertile land from the African population, confiscating it and forcing them 
onto “native” reserves. After the initial settlement, market economic activities serving 
the European settlers’ interests very rapidly developed. At the time of independence in 
1963, abundant commercial and economic interests over which they could exert influence 
were available to the new African political elites. An important factor of the political 
economy in this newly-born Kenya was that the Kikuyu ethnic group, through various 
channels, had a dominant influence over resource distribution. The Kikuyu people were 
the most populous of a many groups (roughly twenty percent), most educated (through 
missionary schools with some elites having acquired even post-graduate degrees in the 
West), most affected by persecution by the colonial government, and most exposed to the 
colonial market economy. All these factors contributed to the Kikuyu elites’ grip on state 
power after independence, clearly disproportionate to their share of total population. 
 The Kikuyu elites, led by the first president Jomo Kenyatta, obtained abundant 
resources such as business stakes in state-owned enterprises, and large-scale farms and 
ranches which European settlers leaving Kenya were only too willing to sell. It is said 
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that the Kenyatta family became the largest land-owner in the country while 
distributing other large land plots to henchmen and past political rivals to win them 
over. Though the beneficiaries of large land plots spread across different ethnic groups, 
the Kikuyu elites seemingly acquired a disproportionately large share. 
 Since the beginning of independence, the Kenyan government, controlled by 
political elites, has received abundant benefits from large formal firms taking advantage 
of political influence. On the other hand,  in the informal sector, though vibrant economic 
activities were found as the famous ILO report indicated (ILO 1972), informal economic 
entities, either individuals or micro-enterprises were mostly ignored or sometimes 
oppressed by central and local governments and seldom developed into formal firms.  
Progress in Kenya suffered from the missing middle syndrome. The informal sector 
became a space that, to some extent, accommodated the unemployed and underemployed 
often immigrating from rural areas which faced increasing land shortage due to rapid 
population expansion.  
 Jomo Kenyatta and the Kikuyu elite surrounding him were faced with intra-
ethnic pressure from ordinary people who had suffered persecution, land deprivation and 
shortages, and destitution in the colonial era to distribute resources more equitably 
(Berman and Lonsdale 1992). The Kikuyu elite attempted to broaden all-weather road 
networks which could help small farmers increase their cash crop production in the 
Central Province, the so-called Kikuyu land. Also, and this is very important to 
understand the Kenyan political and economic history of the time is that the Kikuyu 
elite strongly supported their co-ethnic landless people to migrate and settle in other 
provinces, especially the Rift Valley. Concretely speaking, the Kenyatta administration 
and the Kikuyu elite assisted would-be settlers through public financial schemes and 
private assistance to buy small land plots divided up from large former European land 
holdings (Throup 1987). While people from other land-thirsty ethnic groups, such as 
Luhya, Luo, and Kisii, facing high population density also joined the settlement schemes, 
the Kikuyu people benefitted most.  
 Kikuyu and other immigrant populations moving to settle in the Rift Valley 
rapidly increased from the 1960s to the 1970s. Uasin Gishu was one of the most 
attractive destinations because of its mild climate with adequate rainfall, fertile land, 
and relatively high availability of land plots open to purchase. Uasin Gishu had been 
attractive to European settlers and very large farms were established in the colonial 
days some of which became available after the withdrawal of Europeans following 
independence. As a result of immigration by people from various ethnic groups, Uasin 
Gishu became a multi-ethnic district as Table 1 shows. It is worthy to note that Kikuyu 
was the second largest ethnic group in terms of population and ‘immigrants’ accounted 
for nearly half of the population as early as 1969. 
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 This massive inflow of immigrants of Kikuyu and others was a source of serious 
concern and fear  for the people who had resided in the Rift Valley long before 
colonization, such as Kalenjin-speakers and Maasai. It is said that fear of 
marginalization and grudges against “immigrants,” especially Kikuyu, unified Kalenjin-
speaking groups into one Kalenjin ‘Super-tribe’ from the eve of independence through 
the 1970s (see Lynch 2011). Despite this, the Jomo Kenyatta administration was 
successful in suppressing and placating the opposition of Kalenjin, Maasai, and others, 
the so-called “indigenes.”  However, after Daniel arap Moi, belonging to Tugen, a sub-
group of Kalenjin assumed the presidency succeeding Jomo Kenyatta’s death in 1978, he 
and Kalenjin elites supporting him attempted to push back the land acquired by other 
‘immigrant’ groups (Branch 2011; Ogot 2012). From the 1980s on they mobilized 
measures, sometimes illicit and violent, to take back their ‘ancestral land.’ These 
attempts included forcible expulsion of “immigrants,” notably those without title deeds 
for their land plots (Branch 2011) as well as the illegal transfer of public land to Kalenjin 
elites (GOK 2004). The whole of the Kalenjin community did not necessarily support 
this push back as ordinary people rarely benefitted from it (Klopp 2002; Lynch 2011). 
 The situation after independence described here was a formulation of the 
Kenyan version of the African nexus of problems. It led to a critical conflict which 
seriously jeopardized the existence of the Kenyan nation itself.    
 
1.3  The road to the Post-Election Violence (PEV) 
 Tense inter-ethnic relations in the Rift Valley became apparent and far more 
serious when transition to multi-party democracy started in 1991. The Kalenjin 
population in total was not predominant in electorates even if allied groups such as 
Maasai were included. The Moi administration introduced a rule for presidential 
elections that said the winner must obtain 25 percent of the votes in five out of eight 
provinces. While it was effective to weaken other presidential candidates whose supports 
base was limited to each ethnic groups of his or hers, the Moi and his group had to be 
desperate to secure 25 percent votes in the Rift Valley, their ‘ancestral land’ which had 
become multi-ethnic. Moi and elites in his administration started to expel ‘immigrants’ 
or deter their voting. Violent attacks against Kikuyu, Luo, Luhya, or Kisii residents in 
the Rift Valley by organized gangsters, very likely from the Kalenjin and Maasai 
communities were initiated when the multi-party general election approached in 1992. 
It is believed that the gangs were instigated and supported by political elites close to Moi 
who were also either Kalenjin or Maasai. Some of the elites made outright claims that 
the Rift Valley was the Kalenjin or Maasai homeland and ‘immigrants’ did not have any 
entitlement rights to ownership. However, this claim was not fully embraced by the 
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whole Kalenjin community (Lynch 2011), but probably effective enough to attract 
thousands of land-thirsty unemployed youth to wage violence against their neighbors 
from other ethnic groups.  
 Starting with large-scale violence on the eve of the 1992 election, until the PEV 
in 2007-08, violent clashes intermittently occurred  between ‘indigenes’ i.e. Kalenjin and 
Maasai on the one hand and ‘immigrants’ such as Kikuyu, Luhya, and Luo on the other. 
Some incidents were believed to have  been planned by political elites, while others were 
rather more spontaneous. Thousands of people were killed, hundreds of thousands of 
‘immigrants’ were displaced and a percentage of those displaced lost their land to 
‘indigenes’ through forced sales at a very low price or just simply kicked out. But even so 
there were not many in the Kalenjin community who successfully obtained land and this 
led to frustration among the general Kalenjin populace, especially among the Nandi sub-
group, the most populous group in Uasin Gishu and the second largest among Kalenjin-
speakers as a whole (Klopp 2002). 
 The Nandi people had been the most populous group in many areas of dispute, 
including Uasin Gishu, long before colonial times. It was somewhat surprising that elites 
from other sub-groups such as Tugen (Moi’s sub-group) and Keiyo were able to seize 
important business and economic interests such as large-scale farms in those areas. In 
fact, Nicholas Biwott who was Moi’s right-hand man and Keiyo’s leading political elite 
was able to expand their land ownership during a series of violent clashes after 1992. 
Such ‘intrusion’ invited frustration on the part of Nandi people to other Kalenjin sub-
groups such as the Tugen and Keiyo (Klopp 1992). 
 Internal friction among the Kalenjin escalated into a split of the political elites 
in the presidential election of 2002. Prior to the election, Moi stepped down due to 
constitutional constraints on a president serving two terms and recommended Jomo 
Kenyatta's son, Uhuru Kenyatta, a young Kikuyu businessman, as his successor. Other 
Kalenjin leaders such as Biwott and William Ruto, a rising Nandi leader, opposed this 
move. Ruto cast his support behind the veteran Kikuyu politician, Mwai Kibaki. Kibaki 
won the electoral competition against Uhuru Kenyatta and others, by successfully 
gaining the support of political leaders from other major ethnic groups including the Luo 
led by Raila Odinga and the Nandi led by Ruto. 
 Kibaki, however, broke his promise to form a government based on more power 
sharing among ethnic groups and formed a cabinet dominated by Kikuyu politicians 
close to him. This move angered the other ethnic groups and this anger only deepened 
in 2005 when Kibaki proposed constitutional reforms which further betrayed the people’s 
desire for a more democratized political regime. The campaign during the constitutional 
referendum on Kibaki’s proposal became a literal battle between the Kikuyu and non-
Kikuyu. Kibaki’s proposal failed to obtain a majority support in the referendum. Fearing 
a total loss of power in the next election, the Kikuyu elites drove Kibaki to reconcile with 
Uhuru Kenyatta to unify Kikuyu political forces for the 2007 presidential election. This 
political unification strengthened the Kikuyu but also further strengthened the 
antipathy of other ethnic groups against them. In Uasin Gishu, in particular, the tension 
between Kalenjin and Kikuyu became dire. 
 As the 2007 general election approached, Odinga successfully built an inter-
ethnic alliance among non-Kikuyu communities and emerged as the strongest 
competitor against the Kikuyu forces of Kibaki. Though Odinga was forecast to win the 
presidency and most exit polls agreed, the election commission declared a victory for 
Kibaki and he was sworn in for a second term. This brazen rigging of the election 
provoked Odinga supporters into protests in the streets and violence spread widely in 
the country. Thus began the two-month long conflict we now know as the PEV (Post 
Election Violence).  
 Uasin Gishu was the district where most lives were lost during the PEV. The 
8 
 
district was well known for its muti-ethnic composition and had a large number of 
Kikuyu ‘immigrants.’ The Kikuyu residents became the targets of organized attacks by 
some thousands of Kalenjin, especially the Nandi. Ruto, along with other Kalenjin and 
Maasai leaders claimed that Kikuyu and other immigrants were not entitled to own land 
in the Rift Valley and complained of the unfair dominance of Kikuyu in the government 
which further marginalized the Kalenjin in general and Nandi people in particular. 
There is a  strong presumption that Ruto, in collaboration with those powerful in the 
Nandi community, planned and organized the attacks. The PEV caused 1,133 deaths, 
numerous injuries, and some hundreds of thousands were at least temporarily displaced 
(CIPEV 2008). Ruto, was therefore,  a leading suspect when a trial was arraigned at the 
International Criminal Court (ICC). 
 During the course of the PEV, the Kikuyu people mobilized a gangster 
organization called Mungiki and made massive counter-attacks killing hundreds of 
Kalenjin and Luo people. In his role in organizing the attacks by Kikuyu people, Uhuru 
Kenyatta also became a suspect at the ICC. 
 There was growing fear that the PEV could drive Kenya, as a country, into 
collapse and various efforts were made by stakeholders both at home and abroad to save 
it. It was intermediation, led by Kofi Annan the former UN Secretary General, that 
successfully brought about a reconciliation agreement between the Kibaki camp and the 
Odinga camp to form  a Government of National Unity (GNU) with Kibaki as the 
president and Odinga assuming the newly set up post of Prime Minister. Ruto and Uhuru 
Kenyatta also supported the reconciliation and joined the GNU as ministers.  
 Kenyan politics after the PEV followed a very complex process. Both Ruto and 
Uhuru faced the risk of being charged as international criminals and thus isolated. 
Clashes between Ruto and Odinga over Ruto’s corruption scandal triggered a separation 
of the two. Ruto and Uhuru shared common interest in securing political advantage in 
the 2013 presidential election to decide Kibaki’s successor. The two formidable enemies, 
at the time of the PEV, joined now as allies to compete against Odinga. Elites of both 
Nandi, if not the Kalenjin as a whole, and the Kikuyu came to find common interests 
and a need to co-exist with each other. A coalition between Uhuru and Ruto successfully 
enabled them to win the 2013 presidential election, which made Uhuru the president 
and Ruto the vice-president. 
 These political developments brought peace, at least on the surface, to Uasin 
Gishu. The displaced ‘immigrants’ could return home and resume normal life, which 
meant the purported expulsion of ‘immigrants’ was largely abortive in the case of the 
PEV. In the wake of the PEV, violent clashes and even skirmishes between the Nandi 
and Kikuyu all but disappeared, however trauma and implicit tension remained. The 
ordinary people of Uasin Gishu seemingly regret and are fed up with that series of 
violent episodes and now try to avoid even small disputes with other communities. 
Numerous social activities by local activists and interventions by governments, aid 
agencies, and international NGOs to reduce tension have ensued. These include the road 
construction training we focus on in this paper, designed to consolidate peace and reduce 
poverty and unemployment, especially of the youth, all elements which were regarded 
as among the root causes of the PEV.  
Of all the wide-spread peace-building activities, most remarkable is the 
encouragement of the organization of multiple ethnic youth self-help groups. The 
intervention which we focus on was put forward by an NGO attempting to promote the 
engagement of youth self-help groups in road rehabilitation activities and through 
training and encouragement to develop into formal multi-ethnic corporations. 
 
1.4  The nexus of problems and Uasin Gishu 
The most tragic situation of the PEV in Uasin Gishu was the breakdown of civil 
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society into ethnic conflict. The cause of the situation was not simply due to the multi-
ethnicity of residents in the district (now county). The official inquiry into the PEV 
indicated that inequality of land distribution between ethnic groups, youth 
unemployment, as well as personalization of the political, especially presidential power 
and the proliferation and politicization of violence were the root causes of the PEV 
(CIPEV 2008).  
Distribution of land, the most important production means in villages in Uasin 
Gishu  remained very unequal, as large tracts of land from the Europeans’ land grab of 
colonial days remained intact, and only a small proportion of the European farm land 
was divided up as part of the settlement schemes. In this county, the missing middle 
syndrome in agriculture was very conspicuous. 
But that is not all, this polarization or inequality of land distribution in Uasin 
Gishu did not follow simple ethnic divisions. The large-scale (once European) farms left 
intact in the county were apparently now owned by Kalenjin political elites. The 
inequality of land distribution therefore seemingly a Kalenjin internal problem. One 
should note that there is a strong suspicion that Moi, Biwott, and other Tugen/Keiyo 
elites are among largest land owners in Uasin Gishu (Klopp 1992; and the author’s 
interview with aid experts in the county, September 2010). 
In contrast with this, our field research from 2012 to 2013 in a village where 
ordinary Nandi farmers make up the majority of residents, shows that land plots are 
quite small, on average approximately 1.1 acre. On the other hand, average land plots 
in a village where ordinary Kikuyu farmers (most being ‘immigrants’ or children of 
immigrants) are the overwhelming majority, are not substantially different 
(approximately 1.8 acre). It would be somehow difficult to sustain a household on such a 
small farm whether 1.1 acre or 1.8 acre, especially when a plot comes to be divided due 
to inheritance and so on. As a matter of fact, in both villages young people are opting to 
live away from their home villages in an attempt to find better economic opportunities. 
One major difference between the two groups of ordinary people is that despite continued 
threats by Kalenjin political leaders to expel them, repeated till the end of the PEV, a far 
larger proportion of ordinary Kikuyu farmers feel more secure about their entitlement 
to land than Nandi. The reason for this ironical difference in sense of land security is 
presumably that Kikuyu farmers generally obtained official registration for their land 
plots thanks to settlement arrangements, but this was not quite the same for the Nandi 
people who did not benefit from the elites or government assistance to acquire land plots. 
This perhaps explains why Kikuyu farmers are better able to concentrate on agricultural 
activities and are more successful overall. Both ordinary Nandi and Kikuyu villagers are 
faced with limited plots of land and the risk of destitution but Kikuyu farmers are in a 
slightly better situation than the Nandi (Takahashi & Hasegawa 2017).  
Consequently, ordinary Nandi villagers tend to begrudge both elitist large-farm 
owners, most from other Kalenjin sub-groups such as Tugen and Keiyo, with no land 
security problems due to lack of official registration or farm size; and ordinary Kikuyu 
people with more land security and more agricultural success (Takahashi & Hasegawa 
2017). Although during the PEV, Nandi political leaders headed by Ruto intentionally 
instigated and manipulated only a grudge towards Kikuyu and other ‘immigrants’ to 
mobilize the mass of Nandi people, one of Moi’s large farms was also attacked by arsons 
(CIPEV 2008) and some Keiyo residents became targets of antipathy in a village where 
Nandi people were the majority (Takahashi & Hasegawa 2017). 
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Photo 1: a rural road outside of Eldoret which becomes unusable 
for ordinary passenger cars and pick-up trucks after a heavy rain. 
 
To alleviate the difficult situation of ordinary people in villages in Uasin Gishu, 
it is imperative to initiate multi-dimensional transformation of economic activities: such 
as an increase in land productivity and employment creation. In order to address this, 
poor infrastructure, especially transportation networks, should be improved and more 
non-agricultural employment and income opportunities need to be created. In Uasin 
Gishu, the condition of roads, especially rural feeder roads, is very poor. According to the 
author’s observations from 2011 to 2015, there are large differences in the condition of 
rural roads between counties in the former Central Province (Kikuyu land) and Uasin 
Gishu. In the former Central Province, paved roads with asphalt or concrete have been 
constructed even distances from the national highways into rural areas and roads 
without asphalt or surfaced roads have been improved to be passable in all-weather 
conditions. However, most rural roads, even those directly connected with the national 
highway, are not passable after heavy rains in Uasin Gishu (see Photo 1)  
The poor road infrastructure in rural areas outside the Kikuyu land in general 
and Uasin Gishu in particular is one of the manifestations of inter-regional and inter-
ethnic inequalityrivalry. Poor roads have hampered the development of various socio-
economic activities such as market-oriented agricultural production, the ability to 
commute for employment in cities and towns, and even education. 
With regard to non-agricultural employment, Eldoret, the capital of Uasin 
Gishu county and the fifth most populous city in Kenya, is the main provider of 
opportunities. The population of greater Eldoret municipality was 289,380  or 32.3 
percent of the total population of Uasin Gishu (894,179) in 2009 (KNBS 2010). The 
main industrial activities in Eldoret are relatively large-scale enterprises such as post-
harvest processors of agricultural products, dairy goods producers and textile makers, 
many once state-owned, and now owned by Kalenjin political elites such as the Moi 
family, Biwott and others. However even these large enterprises do not seem to be able 
to provide sufficient employment opportunities to absorb the rapidly increasing labor 
force in the city. While the population of Uasin Gishu increased 4.7 times between 1969 
and 2009,3 Eldoret’s population grew 15.9 times during the same period (MFEP-SD 
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1970 and KNBS 2010) 4. As labor-intensive, vibrant middle-sized formal enterprises 
are not active in the city, many workers have little choice but to stay in the informal 
sector in the city and surrounding areas. In fact, those able to find jobs in informal or 
semi-formal street manufacturing such as metal work or furniture production, appear 
to be relatively fortunate5.  
 Interventions by the government and the international NGO which we will 
discuss in detail in the next section aim at developing road construction enterprises 
which utilize labor-based technology and could have the dual effect of improving road 
conditions while creating employment and income opportunities. It is anticipated that 
this could be a solution to the difficulties mentioned above in the locality of Uasin 
Gishu. In addition, the beneficiaries of the NGO’s assistance to promote corporatization 
are to be multi-ethnic. Therefore, the interventions may result in reinforcement of 
reconciliation and peace-building through inter-ethnic collaboration leading to 
threefold effects in the solving of difficulties. Finally, a solution to the missing middle 
syndrome in African industrial structure is possible if the development of newly 
formalized and corporatized companies from informal groups is successful, which 
would mean a fourfold outcome could be perhaps be expected.  
 
1.5  Research Questions: External Interventions, Enterprise Developments, and Inter-
Ethnic Relations  
 Having discussed the varied backgrounds of this study and our fourfold 
expectations for intervention by the international NGO and national and local 
governments as noted above in sub-section 1.4, our research questions can be specified 
as follows: 
 
1. Questions regarding the success of road construction enterprise promotion. 
1.1 Were interventions by the NGO and Kenyan government successful in 
generating local implementation agents and corporations which could create 
employment and engage in road construction work. 
1.2 How were the interventions by the NGO and governments effected and were 
they successful in promotion of corporatization (and thus formalization) and 
development of former youth self-help groups in Uasin Gishu, Kenya. 
2. Questions of inter-ethnic relations with regard to enterprise development. 
2.1 Do successfully corporatized and developing enterprises contribute to the 
enhancement of inter-ethnic reconciliation and collaboration in Uasin Gishu;  
2.2 How does the ethnic composition affect the degree of success of corporatization 
and development of enterprises in the county; 
2.3  How effective do the enterprises and corporations in question apply meritocracy 
and disciplinary management presumed to be effective in overcoming ethnically-
biased grouping of people and thus inter-ethnic enmity in the county. 
 
The author believes these questions, on their own, lay claim to the significance of 
this study. Firstly, there have been numerous socio-political studies on outcomes in post-
conflict areas in Africa, but there is a dearth of studies on business activity and corporate 
development. Secondly, although there have been a limited number of studies on 
corporatization and formalization of informal entities in industries in Africa, the 
acceptance of the missing middle syndrome has constrained researchers from looking 
further and thus signs of change in the syndrome are not readily apparent. Empirical 
examinations have been very limited, and this is especially unfortunate since African 
governments have been encouraged to involve themselves in promotion of this kind of 
business activity since the 1980s (World Bank 1989), Thirdly, there are uncountable 
studies on NGO interventions and their role in social development in Africa, but very 
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little on assistance of corporatization and formalization of enterprises. Fourthly, the 
NGO in this paper has been trying to transfer this unique road upgrading technology 
called Do-nou technology to Kenyans, but social scientific studies on their activities are 
almost nil except for that done by the NGO members themselves. Fifthly, while some 
work has focused on relations between growth, development and productivity on the one 
hand and multi-ethnic make up of members on the other (e.g. Easterly and Levine 1997; 
Miguel and Gugerty 2005; Miguel et al. 2006; Hjort 2014), findings vary and there has 
been little focus on success in the corporatization of private enterprises, therefore further 
analysis is not only worthwhile, but needed.  
 
2. Assistance by an NGO and the Kenyan Government to Advance Road Construction 
Skills,  Know-how and Corporatization  
2.1. Labor-based road construction technologies and youth unemployment. 
There was a consensus among Kenyan government officials and aid agencies, as 
early as the 1980s, that labor-based technology was the best measure to solve problems 
of underdevelopment of rural roads and unemployment, especially that of youth (KIHBT-
KTC 2015). This is all the more true, if fiscal constraints are taken into consideration, 
since capital-intensive road construction using heavy machinery is inappropriate. 
Therefore, the Kenyan government, supported by foreign aid, has been developing 
an institutional framework, under the ministry in charge, to train young people in the 
skills required to engage in labor-based technologies of road construction (including 
maintenance, upgrading, and rehabilitation). The Kisii Training Centre, Kenya Institute 
of Highways & Building Technology, Ministry of Transport and Infrastructure (hereafter 
KIHBT-KTC) is an important venue to implement training programs to develop labor-
based road construction technologies and related know-how. KIHBT-KTC has been 
conducting various training programs for a wide range of people recruited from the 
private sector, especially youths, to disseminate labor-based road construction 
technologies throughout Kenya. 
 
2.2 An International NGO’s Engagement and Do-nou Technology. 
Do-nou, in Japanese, is literally a bag filled with soil. It is usually used in flood 
prevention, e.g. when a river bank is in danger of collapse.  A Japanese NGO, called Michi-
Bushin-Bito (literally ‘a road constructor’ in old Japanese) started to apply Do-nou 
technology to upgrade muddy roads into all-weather specification. If a number of Do-nou 
are lined up in orderly manner, roads that were mired in mud in the rain, could withstand 
even the weight of lorries and never became unpassable as long as a degree of maintenance 
was kept up. Do-nou technology can change muddy roads into all-weather roads. 
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Photo 1: Female villagers preparing Do-nou by filling gunny bags with murram (a 
clayey material used for road building) (http://corekenya.org/gallery/) 
 
 
Photo 2: Do-nou’s are lined up after being flattened (http://corekenya.org/gallery/) to 
underpin an all-weather road 
 
Do-nou technology is appropriate for labor-based projects in local African communities. 
Usually, 45cm x 60cm gunny bags are used to wrap murram, a form of laterite (clayey soil). 
The material, though often locally available, is not always easy to obtain and therefore local 
markets have been generated. Do-nou technology is very much manual-labor-based and not 
too difficult to learn and has the potential to create sustainable employment. Also, as long 
as regular maintenance is conducted, roads with Do-nou are very durable 
(http://corekenya.org/do-nou-technology/). 
CORE, the Kenyan branch of the Japanese NGO, Michi-Bushin-Bito, began 
disseminating Do-nou technology widely in Kenya several months after the PEV, including 
in conflict-ridden areas. They conducted road improvement and rehabilitation 
demonstrations using Do-nou technology in Uasin Gishu and have instructed 36 self-help 
youth groups in the county6. Staff members of CORE, headed by Japanese executives, 
taught not only the merits of road rehabilitation, but also the potential expansion of 
economic opportunities, such as production of high-value added horticultural crops which 
need smooth, safe and timely transportation. Also, in conflict-ridden areas like the villages 
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in Uasin Gishu, CORE executives appealed to young participants about the importance of 
reconciliation and collaboration beyond ethnic differences. They also emphasized the 
benefits of sustainable development through corporatized formal enterprises and the 
significance and necessity of burdens such as tax payments associated with formal 
registration as a requirement for the betterment of the society as a whole7. 
Moved by CORE’s presentation and persuasion, Do-nou technology is recognized by 
Kenyan Rural Road Authority (KeRRA) as an appropriate mode of labor-based road 
construction technology. KeRRA provided assistance with youth employment promotion 
budgets for road rehabilitation and some Uasin Gishu self-help groups supported by CORE 
have already obtained road construction contracts. CORE also stepped in to financially 
assist their activities to prepare and undertake construction, as KeRRA’s disbursement was 
delayed8. 
 
2.3 Training by Collaboration between KIHBT-KTC and CORE 
CORE further attempted to promote qualified self-help groups by helping to train their 
representatives in a systematic way, eventually aiming at corporatization of the self-help 
groups. To this end, in 2012, the NGO started to select and send qualified people from the 
youth self-help groups to ILO-sponsored training by KIHBT-KTC so that the groups would 
be qualified as contracting companies with the government for road construction projects. 
The training at KIHBT-KTC and subsequent registration as a firm are conditions that 
must be met to be formally registered as a qualified construction company with the 
National Construction Authority (NCA). 
Following KeRRA’s recognition of the value of Do-nou technology, it was adopted by 
KIHBT-KTC and training programs introducing Do-nou technology in collaboration with 
CORE began in 2015. KIHBT-KTC and CORE conducted six-week road construction 
training programs at the KIHBT-KTC campus in Kisii bringing together young participants 
from the various counties under the overarching developmental purpose of youth 
empowerment. These programs consciously aim at building not only road construction 
skills but also the ability to open and develop their businesses as formal construction 
enterprises. Learning Do-nou technology was an important element in the skill building 
part of the programs. CORE contributed to the programs by seconding trainers. Concretely 
speaking, the program consisted of learning “labour based road rehabilitation and 
improvement, Do-Nou Technology, contract management and administration, and business 
management and routine maintenance” (KIHBT-KTC [2015:14]). 
As the training programs prioritized practical learning, they taught not only theory but 
also held exercises in the field. Participants’ performance evaluations were based 40% on 
theory and 60% on practice (KIHBT-KTC [2015:14]).  
In addition to seconding trainers, CORE has further assisted the training programs by 
selecting 50 of the 122 participants and has continued to financially support participants 
with training fees. 
According to a Michi-Bushin-Bito executive, CORE chose participants for the program 
by taking into consideration their personalities and performance as leaders of youth self-
help groups with experience in CORE’s Do-nou technology transfer activities implemented 
in their localities. Moreover, in principle, since the KTC participants need a certain level of 
mathematics to understand theoretical courses in the program, those who had completed 
Form 4 (grade 12) or more were chosen. So far, CORE has sent 19 young people to KIHBT-
KTC training (9 people in 2012 for an ILO-sponsored program and 10 in 2015 for the new 
program).9 
 
3. Methodologies and Results of the Field Research 
3.1. Methodologies 
 For a research method to answer the questions listed in 1.5, the author adopted semi-
structured interviews with a prepared questionnaire (see Appendix). The questionnaire 
focused on attributes of interviewees i.e. ethnic composition of group members, 
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conditions for group membership, contents learned from CORE activities and/or KIHBT-
KTC training, qualifications to be a member of a group, internal management methods 
used in enterprises from meritocratic and disciplinary viewpoints, and their enterprises’ 
business performances (see Appendix 1). 
In order to analyze the impact of CORE’s dissemination activities and KTC training 
on the development process of moving from informal self-help groups into corporatized 
formal firms, we asked Michi-Bushin-Bito and CORE to help us contact youth self-help 
groups in Uasin Gishu which experienced CORE’s training and the KIHBT-KTC 
program. Taking advantage of recorded of CORE’s group data, we contacted 10 self-help 
groups which had registered as formal corporations and one that had not. This allowed 
us to research 11 groups, over half of the 19 groups which experienced CORE’s 
technological transfer and KIHBT-KTC training program in Uasin Gishu. The 
interviews were made with leaders from the 11 self-help groups. In Groups E & F, the 
leaders had no personal experience with the KIHBT-KTC training program but 
responded on behalf of group colleagues who had but were unavailable. The author 
interviewed two leaders for both groups A & F, and as a result the total number of 
interviewees was 13, not 11. There were 17 other groups which had experienced CORE’s 
dissemination activities but had not received the KIHBT-KTC training program and so 
were not interviewed.  
3-2. Results of the Research 
 The 11 groups, whose leaders were interviewed by the author, are listed in Table 
2. Table 2 shows the groups in order of sales from 2013 to 2016. The table includes 
important aspects of the questionnaire: 1. Condition for membership, 2. Success in 
registration 3. Sales (2013–16), 4. Education level of leaders, 5. Rank of performance in 
the KIHBT-KTC training program, 6. Ethnic composition of permanent members, 5. 
With regard to character of ethnic composition, “indigenes” means permanent members 
consist of only Kalenjin people, while “mixed” means both Kalenjin and “immigrants” 
are included. 
  
 
 
 
Table 2-1: Self-help groups in Uasin Gishu and their success/failure in road construction business
Membership Success in Registration Sales (2013-16): Ksh Final education of the top Rank at KTC*
Group A same village/school yes 13,000,000 university 2
Group B same village yes 10,816,819 university N.A.
Group C same village yes 300,000 college 13
Group D public purpose yes 300,000 college 17
Group E same village yes 230,000 university N.A.
Group F same village yes no answer graduate school N.A.
Group G same village yes no answer college 4
Group H same village yes (merged with I & J) no answer form 4 24
Group I same village/school yes (merged with H & J) no answer form 2 31
Group J same village yes (merged with H & I) no answer form 4 31
Group K same village fail no answer form 4 23
Table 2-2: Self-help groups in Uasin Gishu and their ethnicity
Ethnic composition of permanent members Ethnic character Remarks
Group A "indigenes"
Group B "indigenes"
Group C "indigenes"
Group D mixed
Group E mixed
Group F mixed
Group G "indigenes" Ogek is a very small "hunter-gatherer" group
Group H
Group I
Group J
Group K (mixed)
Source: created by the author based on interviews conducted in September-October 2016 and KIHBT-KTC 2015.
(Nandi)
head is a pastor, supply tissue paper to local government
collective empowerment in neighborhood 
5 groups in different places were encouraged to merge
multi-ethnicity was blamed as a cause for collapse.
mixed
Kikuyu/Kisii
Sabaot/Luo
Nandi/Ogek
Keiyo/Nandi/Kisii
*Rank at KTC means evaluation of each trainee's performance in the firtst batch of the KIHBT-KTC training program whose participants
were 40. Group B's leader attended the training program in 2012, evaluation data of which is not available. Leaders of Groups E and F
"hate politics," enthusiastic, entrepreneurial
many original members have left 
accusing corruption and outsiders
committed in social activities, politically oriented
Keiyo 
Nandi/Keiyo/Marakwet
Nandi/Keiyo
Kisii/Luhya/Kamba/Kikuyu/Nandi/Luo
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3.2 Results of Research 
3.2.1 Condition for membership 
 
Every group except Group D answered that living in same village was the most 
important condition for membership.  In addition to be a ‘youth’ group, members had to 
be under 35 at the time of organization. No interviewees said that ethnicity or clan was 
a condition for membership. 
The leader of Group D stressed openness of membership and said they aimed at 
fighting youth delinquency and achieving social justice. Yet, according to the author’s 
research assistant who was a resident of Uasin Gishu, Group D was based in a particular 
area in suburbs of Uasin Gishu. The Group D leader also told us that he aspired to run 
for a seat on the County Assembly and seemingly he and his colleagues placed high 
priority on socio-political purposes. On the contrary, the top leader of Group A revealed 
that he hated and tried to distant himself from politics.  
 Group E’s leader was a clergyman and the group was very much faith-based 
trying to contribute to peace building among different groups in its neighborhood. 
 Group A and Group I, answered that being alumni of the same school located in 
their localities was another condition. The author interviewed two leaders of Group A 
and it seemed that they were very close to each other, friends that went to the same 
secondary school.  
 As a matter of course, among the 13 interviews, 12 answered that interest 
and/or commitment to road construction activity was an important condition of 
membership. Also, 8 chose importance of diligence and honesty. It is interesting that only 
the top leader of Group A stressed the importance of trust among members. 
 Few indicated the importance of certain levels of education or skills as 
conditions for membership.    
3.2.2 Registration as a formal corporation 
 Of the 11 groups in question, three groups (Groups H, I, & J) formed one entity 
and became registered as a formal construction firm. Altogether, 10 groups were formally 
registered (three together as one), while one group (Group K) failed. Consequently, the 
number of registered firms contacted was eight. 
 The majority of interviewees answered that KTC training helped them clear the 
complex registration procedures. Most found merits in registration despite the 
cumbersome procedures and burdens of taxation. Opportunities to contract with the 
government seemed to be very attractive. One of the leaders of Group A (not the top 
leader) revealed an affirmative view for paying tax as a contribution to development of 
the society as a whole, referring to the teaching by an executive of CORE. On the other 
hand, the leader of Group C was concerned about corruption involved with tenders and  
road construction project contracts with the government. 
3.2.3 Performance of business 
 Five of the eight registered firms provided sales amounts from 2013 to 2016. 
Groups F, H, I, and J answered that their firms had not been very successful in the road 
construction business. Also, though Group E had a modest amount of sales, it was not 
through road construction but through another kind of business (sale of paper to the 
Uasin Gishu county government). Between Groups A and B on the one hand, and Group 
C and D on the other, there were large differences in the  amounts of sales. While the 
former were constantly successful in winning contracts with local governments, the 
latter two only won one contract each. Also, it should be noted that the leader of Group 
G did not provide a sales amount, although he said they had been successful in obtaining 
some small road construction contracts.   
 The variances among the groups require further exploration and explanation, 
which will be developed in the next section. 
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3.2.4 Education and training 
 Table 2 shows education level of the top leader in each group. Out of the eleven, 
one has made it to graduate school, three have gone to university, and three have studied 
at college. The other four have secondary school education. The leaders of the five firms 
making sales all have higher educations and the two highest-performing firms’ leaders 
have bachelor degrees.10 
 Every interviewee responded that they acquired road 
construction/rehabilitation technologies including Do-nou, ways of designing and 
implementing road works, organization and management of workers and groups, 
accounting skills, and knowledge of business negotiation through activities and training 
programs offered by CORE and KIHBT-KTC. There were apparently no differences 
among interviewees with regard to satisfaction with the training. The majority indicated 
the importance of Core in their ability to motivate and initiate road construction 
activities and businesses. 
We gained some knowledge of how the participants performed in the above-
mentioned KIHBT-KTC program assisted by CORE in 2015. According to KIHBT-KTC 
[2015] the leader of Group A was very successful in training11 as well as his counterpart 
in Group G. The top leader of Group A was very knowledgeable in road construction 
technologies as well as the national government’s policy framework to promote business 
by young people and stated that his firm employed an engineer with expertise in 
construction technologies. In the interview, the author strongly felt his enthusiasm for 
this business as  compared to other interviewees.  
3.2.5 Ethnic Composition of groups/firms 
 The two highest-performing firms (Group A and Group B) consisted of only 
Kalenjin (‘indigenes’) people.  The same held true for Group G which also performed 
quite well. Group A is notably comprised of only the sub-ethnic group Keiyo. The leader 
of Group B advised the author that “other” people left the group during its development 
and the expansion of its business.  
 The leader of Group K remarked that multi-ethnic composition made internal 
decision-making and collaboration difficult and drove the group into collapse. He feels 
that this is the reason why his group could not develop into a formal registered 
corporation. 
 We found that “mixed” firms did not perform as well as Groups A and B. Rather, 
Groups D and E, both intentionally stayed “mixed,” and prioritized political or social 
aims and thus did not focus only on profit-making activities. It might be well to contrast 
this with the stated aim of the Group B leader, that the group was organized to obtain 
contracts with the government from the beginning.  
3.2.6 Employment and Internal Management 
 In regard to the construction business in general, it is important to note that it 
creates far more part-time employment than permanent employment. Groups A, B, C, 
D, and E all answered that they hired many additional people only on ad hoc basis for 
construction work.     
Since few groups felt that skill or education was a necessary condition, there 
appears to be little room for meritocracy to function in terms of recruitment or grouping. 
This is presumably related to both the genesis of self-help groups and the nature of the 
road construction business in question. Youth self-help groups in Uasin Gishu were 
based largely on residential areas and were supposed to be as inclusive as possible. Also, 
the labor-based technologies of road construction such as Do-nou do not require much 
expertise or knowledge except for those in managerial and planning positions. 
None of the groups/firms prepared wage scales proportionate to ability or 
performance of employees. Groups C, D, and E disallowed punishment. Group E leader 
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stressed religious reasons for not punishing faults or frauds, and instead preferred to 
convince the person committing an illicit act to reflect by himself or herself. Yet other 
Groups (A, B, F, I & J) affirmed the importance of punishment especially against 
embezzlement (B and J), fraud (I), and drunkenness (F). The leader of Group A informed 
that his firm applied a system of payment reductions in cases where a sub-contractor or 
part-time employee could not meet a work deadline. 
 
 
4. Discussion: Can Development of Small Road Construction Firms be a Solution for 
the Nexus of Problems 
 
In response to the research questions presented in sub-section 1.5, we would like to 
develop our discussion of how to understand causality and the implications of what we 
have observed. Research questions on development of road construction enterprises (1.1 
and 1.2), and questions on inter-ethnic relations and enterprise development (2.1, 2.2 
and 2.3) are to be discussed separately in this section. 
 
4.1 NGO and governments’ success in interventions for the promotion of corporatization 
and thus formalization and development of former youth self-help groups engaged in 
road construction.  
Out of the 11 youth self-help groups interviewed, 10 have successfully registered as 
formal road construction corporations. On the surface this would appear to be a complete 
success. However, we have to take into account the fact that CORE contacted 36 youth 
self-groups in Uasin Gishu to transfer Do-nou technology and we could not interview the 
other 25 groups. As mentioned above, the KTC training programs required a certain 
level of mathematic skill and CORE and KTC selected groups with relatively highly 
educated members (basically those with secondary education or higher). Consequently, 
our interviewees were not representative of the youth self-help groups as a whole that 
were more or less exposed to Do-nou technology in Uasin Gishu. Having recognized these 
limitations, we will now interpret the results of the research.      
The above limitations notwithstanding, we can surely state that the NGO and 
government interventions have been successful in generating local groups and 
corporations which create employment to engage in road construction by applying labor-
based technologies, though on a still somewhat ad-hoc basis.  
CORE, the Kenyan subsidiary of an international NGO played a positive role in the 
promotion of road construction businesses. More than half of the interviewees stated 
that CORE, by introducing Do-nou technology, a typical labor-based road construction 
technology, motivated their interest in road construction activities and businesses. If it 
had been a technology with high capital intensiveness, it would not have maintained 
their interest since it would probably be too difficult to learn and involve high  risk 
investments (see McCormick 1992 and 1993). 
The success of four groups in obtaining road construction contracts with the 
government, especially with Groups A and B consistently winning them, means that 
local corporations emerged which could engage in road construction in Uasin Gishu and 
other counties, partly due to the interventions.  
With regard to corporatization, while we appreciate the fact that 10 out of 11 groups 
(or eight among nine clusters) completed the complicated procedures for corporatization, 
we should take into account the fact that construction businesses have no obligation to 
pay taxes on sales if they don't win contracts12. Compared with manufacturing activities 
which by nature necessitate firms to make products and sales regularly and to pay sales 
taxes applicable, construction enterprise leaders might have found it less costly to 
formalize less fearing the burdens of taxation. 
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 Needless to say, mere corporatization and formalization would not have been 
the ultimate aim of the interventions by the NGO and the government. Successful and 
sustainable expansion of their businesses hopefully creating more employment, taking 
advantage of formalization and corporatization, should be the goal. As we have seen in 
Table 2, business performance, in terms of sales, varies strikingly. Among interventions 
by the NGO and the government, we might presume here that training matters. When 
we see the relation between the educational backgrounds of the top leaders, and their 
training performances at KIHBT-KTC, and the extent of their success in business, we 
can interpret the effects of training in two dimensions. Firstly, as Table 2 demonstrates, 
the leaders of higher performing firms recorded better results in the KIHBT-KTC 
training program, though regrettably we could not know how trainees from Groups B, E 
and F performed. This might mean, that if the contents of the program were well 
understood by the trainees, it was meaningful for their success in the road construction 
business. Secondly, it seems that performance in the program was very much influenced 
by educational background. Education levels higher than secondary appeared to be a 
condition for better training performance.  
This implies that training interventions by the NGO and the government could 
have limited effect on enabling micro and small enterprises led by people with lower 
education levels. Unfortunately this corresponds to a large majority in the informal 
sector and rural areas. What we observed in the road construction business in Uasin 
Gishu is encouraging from the viewpoint of changes in the missing middle syndrome, in 
the sense that informal local enterprises, such as Groups A and B, developed into 
successful formal corporations in a short time. However, we should be very cautious not 
to state that we could find a large scale breakthrough in the syndrome when we take 
account the required educational backgrounds needed for the success, as mentioned 
above.  
  
4.2 Relations between development and meritocratic organization of enterprises, inter-
ethnic reconciliation, and ethnic composition 
 While development and organization of multi-ethnic youth self-help groups 
were promoted after the PEV, road construction corporations succeeding them have 
apparently followed different paths. Members of the two most successful corporations 
(Groups A & B) comprise only ‘indigenes’ and those of the highest-performing Group A 
belong to only one sub-ethnic-group (Keiyo). If Group G (whose sales amounts we do not 
know) is also successful in business performance, we could say that groups/firms 
consisting of only ‘indigenes’ are more successful than ‘mixed’ groups.  
 We should be cautious to simply conclude that there is a negative correlation 
between multiplicity of ethnicity (or mixture of ‘indigenes’ and ‘immigrants’) and 
business performance, since ‘mixed’ groups were not totally excluded from public 
contracts as the cases of Groups D and E show. 
 Groups D and E, however, did not aim at the sole purpose of high business 
performance or profit making. A more important purpose was rather socio-political, 
including inter-ethnic collaboration itself. If their earnings from business helped them 
promote inter-ethnic reconciliation activities they were happy and so the cases of D and 
E also have positive implications for our Research Question 2.1. 
 Nevertheless, we cannot say that better business performances of the eight 
firms (11 groups) has promoted inter-ethnic reconciliation and collaboration. In this 
context, business activities of these newly corporatized firms has probably  changed them 
from being multi-faceted development activities by informal youth self-help groups 
which were induced to be multi-ethnic. 
 At issue here is how to understand the large variance of business performance 
between the firms in question with regard to their ethnic composition. There are at least 
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three possible explanations: first, firms led by or only consisting of ‘indigenes’ may be 
given special treatment by co-ethnics in the county government or in decision-making 
bodies; second, higher-performing firms have developed strong personal connections 
with officials with the government, which may be the result of nepotism or corruption; 
third, ethnically homogenous firms or those with close relations among members have 
an added advantage in that they could develop mutual trust and thus reduce transaction 
costs in the process of decision-making. 
 The first explanation cannot be totally ignored and would have very serious 
implications in view of solving the said Kenyan nexus of developmental problems as it 
means there is ethnically-biased consideration in public procurement. We, however, have 
to notice that other groups led by ‘indigenes’ are not performing as well as Groups A and 
B. The top leader of Group C (belonging to Nandi, ‘indigenous’ sub-ethnic group and his 
group is purely ‘indigenous’) complained that there is corruption and contracts were 
taken by ‘outsiders’, though he did not clarify what ‘outsiders’ meant. Also, other groups 
led by ‘indigenes,’ though they are mixed, except Group G, never benefited from such 
ethnically-biased discrimination. Also, if government officials in charge selectively 
treated purely ‘indigenous’ groups, it would be outright opposition to the goal of fostering 
inter-ethnic reconciliation after the PEV.  
On the other hand, we also have to notice the fact that Group A consists of only 
Keiyo. Being purely Keiyo might be related to the Keiyo sub-group’s strong political and 
economic influence. Such Keiyo’s predominance has invited anger of Nandi as we have 
already seen in the sub-section 1.3. In that sense, it would have further serious 
implication for local politics and relations between sub-groups inside Kalenjin. Yet, the 
author does not have enough evidence to verify the continuation of Keiyo dominance in 
Uasin Gishu politics and business after Ruto, a Nandi, became powerful enough to 
assume the vice-presidency.  While Group B, another outstandingly successful group also 
includes a Keiyo in leaders, the fact that Group C, and the cluster of Groups H, I and J 
also do.  Therefore, overall, we cannot conclude that the first explanation is decisively 
right.   
 The second explanation, which is also claimed by the Groups C leader, also 
cannot be totally rejected. The interviews with the two leaders of Group A revealed that 
they were well acquainted with government officials. This might explain their constant 
winning of contracts. However, other than the accusation by the Group C leader, there 
was no empirical evidence of corrupt relations between successful firms and the 
government. Rather, their close acquaintance might be a result of their repeated success. 
In other words, causality can be opposite. 
 The third explanation seems most likely. The top leader of Group A specifically 
stressed the importance of trust. His counterpart in Group B indicated a separation with 
‘other people’ who had been fellow members of the self-help group. The top leader of 
Group K emphasized that multi-ethnicity was the cause of collapse of the self-help group 
but also said that consensus building was very difficult partly due to a lack of enthusiasm 
for collective activities. Thus the core reason for success or failure in business is not 
ethnic multiplicity itself but transaction costs involving internal decision-making and 
management. Mutual trust and understanding could reduce such transaction costs of 
decision-making and management. 
The serious challenge in Uasin Gishu, an area ridden by inter-ethnic relations, 
multiplicity of ethnicity, especially combination of ‘immigrants’ and ‘indigenes’, can make 
trust-building more difficult inside a group than the case of a group with single ethnicity. 
However, even though Group K collapsed, other ‘mixed’ groups are now in the process of 
building trust among members, which could be the basis for smooth internal 
management. Meanwhile, Groups D and E aim at building peaceful relations among 
people both inside and outside each group. Groups A and B could probably avoid those 
21 
 
costs of trust building and the transaction costs of internal management for them was 
considerably small. These are probably important reasons for their success in business, 
among other factors, including the capability of their top leaders. Another importance of 
internal trust among members is that it can make internal knowledge transfer easy, as 
those who have been trained do not have to fear negative externality of sharing acquired 
knowledge with fellow others. In other words, they have to be concerned about high 
possibility of neither ‘stealing’ nor producing business competitors. 
 The third explanation also seemingly explains why interviewed groups almost 
uniformly did not adopt meritocracy among members. Group A, quite firmly based on 
mutual trust, did not require meritocratic and disciplinary internal management, 
though it did apply sanctions on delay of work by part-time and external contractors. 
‘Mixed’ groups were too busy building trust internally (also externally) to introduce strict 
meritocracy and disciplinary management, such as punishment, which could bring about 
increased tension among members. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
The importance of internal trust and transaction costs related to the success of 
corporatization argued in Section 5 is noteworthy. Though reduction of market 
transaction costs has been emphasized by economists as the rationale for a firm to exist 
separate from markets since Coase indicated (Coase 1974), transaction costs involved in 
intra-firm management and corporate development have not been given enough 
attention. Needless to say, the importance of social capital or trust as a positive element 
in economic efficiency and growth has become a focus in economics, the factors that 
influence intra-firm trust to reduce internal transaction costs need more exploration and 
discussion.  
Our findings suggest that trust matters all the more in post-conflict localities and 
trust is influenced by ethnic relations where conflict has been waged between different 
ethnic groups. If a group of people consists of members from warring ethnicities, they 
have to focus on building trust, at least in the beginning, which might involve heavy 
transaction costs. Groups exempt from such transaction costs could find advantage in 
competition, i.e. in the bidding for road construction contracts with the government.           
 Therefore, the situation in the development phase, after corporatization, would 
be very different from the initial phase where organization and activities of self-help 
groups were most universally promoted. Simply speaking, the post-self-help group phase 
(or the post-corporatization phase) would be where the logic of competition predominated 
and therefore the efficiency and internal trust underpinning it, in addition to the 
capability of leading members, mattered greatly.       
 In an area once ridden by inter-ethnic conflicts such as Uasin Gishu, ethnic 
heterogeneity could be a factor raising internal managerial costs. Also, there is a concern 
that as successful corporations are organized in ethnicity-wise, inter-corporation 
competition could lead to perpetuation and/or deepening of ethnic cleavages in such an 
area. However, we can never say it is unsurmountable. The success of a few multi-ethnic 
groups (Group D and E) in business is to some extent, encouraging. 
 Having stressed the difficulties of working in a conflict-ridden area in terms of 
business promotion, we should reiterate that the interventions by the NGO and the 
government were meaningful in terms of disseminating labor-based technology, 
motivating road construction activities, and the capacity building of already educated 
leaders to promote corporatization and development of their enterprises. 
 The thorny problem here is the fact that those successful in corporatization and 
development were already highly educated and able to absorb much of the training. As 
already mentioned, these interventions by the NGO and the government could not 
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therefore be a large-scale solution to the missing middle syndrome, for the leaders of 
African micro and small enterprises are, in a majority of the cases, far less educated. 
 The challenge now is to discover how NGOs and governments, concerned with 
promotion of micro and small enterprises, can play catalytic roles to connect those with 
higher education and resources to situations leading to the growth of micro and small 
enterprises. This is an important challenge to business incubation policies, not only in 
the road construction sector, but also in a broad range of industrial activities in Africa 
as a whole.     
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Appendix 1: Questionnaire 
Ref. no.: ________ 
Date of interview ___________ 
1. Name of Interviewee                      
 
2. Date of Birth and Age 
 
3. Place of Birth                      
 
4. Sex  Male  Female 
 
5. Ethnicity  
 
6. Final Education 
 
7. When did you receive CORE training and how long? 
 
8. Have you received KTC (Kisii Training Centre) training? If Yes, when? 
 
9. Any other technical/vocational training? If yes, what? 
  
10. What skills, knowledge, and other factors have training programs you have received 
helped you acquire? 
(1)  Only Do Nou technology 
(2)  Other road construction/rehabilitation technologies 
If yes, which training has helped you? 
(3)  How to design and implement road construction/rehabilitation in general 
If yes, which training has helped you? 
(4)  How to organize people to work in collaboration with each other? 
If yes, which training has helped you? 
(5)  How to manage group/enterprise 
If yes, which training has helped you? 
(6)  Accounting skills 
If yes, which training has helped you? 
(7)  How to negotiate with business counterparts (supplier of materials, banks, 
contractors, government agencies including municipal governments) 
If yes, which training has helped you? 
(8)  Qualification to apply for NCA registration (through KTC or others) 
(9)  Other (Please explain)  
 
11. When did you organize your group? What is the name of group?  
Time of organization:                      
Group name:                      
 
12. What are conditions to belong to your group? Or, how to select members? 
Please choose from the below: 
(1) closeness (family relations, same clan, same village, same school etc.)  
(2)  interest/commitment in activity 
(3) personality such as honesty or diligence 
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(4) education level 
(5) skills/capability 
(6)  other (Please explain) 
 
13. Have you registered your group as a company?  
13.1 If yes, what is the name of the company? Why did you opt for registration while 
you have to pay tax or fulfill government obligations? What benefits did you expect 
for registration? (→１5) 
Company name: ＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿ 
13.2  If no, why have you not opted for registration?  
 
14. Have you registered with National Construction Authority (NCA)? 
14.1 If yes, why did you opt for NCA registration while you have to pay tax and 
registration fee or fulfill obligations? What benefits did you expect?  
14.2  If no, why have you not opted for NCA registration?  
 
15. (← 13.1) Does your company have an office, workshops, warehouses or other 
facilities separate from any members’ residence? If yes, please specify. 
(1) office 
(2) workshops 
(3) warehouses 
(4) others (Please explain) 
 
16. What is your position in the company? 
 
17. How many members/employees did and do you have? 
17.1 Full time: (in the beginning)   (now) 
17.2 Part time:  (in the beginning)   (now) 
 
１8． Do you have employees only doing clerical works? If yes, what do they do 
concretely? How many are they? 
 
１9． Have you hired new employees after your registration as a company?  If yes,  
teach Do Nou technology and other road construction/rehabilitation skills? 
 
２０． How to decide wages/rewards to members and employees? 
 
２１． Have you punished any members or employees for their faults, neglects or 
frauds?  
21.1 If yes, how did you punish (e.g. by dismissal, suspension from work, fine, 
reprimand or others) for what faults, neglects, or frauds? 
 Punishment: 
 Faults or frauds: 
21.2 If no, and even if anyone have  why have you not punished them?  Have you 
opted for solving problems together with other members by discussion or mutual 
cooperation rather than punishing particular ones? 
 
２2.   If you do not mind, please give us the following information on your group/company: 
(1) Registered capital 
(2) Paid up capital 
(3) Sales of recent years 
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 2013                      
2014                      
2015                      
2016                                          
(4) the number of construction/rehabilitation projects you have engaged 
(5) Category classified by NCA as a contractor (if applicable) : 
(6) Equipment and machines you have: 
 
２ ３ ． If you do not mind, please give the following information of your 
members/employees. If too many, it can be limited to directors or original 
members/founders. If information is not known, please write “N.A.” 
 
no. name* position relation with 
the leader** 
Ethnicity years
***  
age 
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
 
Note: * If you mind, you do not have to specify names. You can just show “Director A” or 
“Manager B.”  
** Relation with the leader can be shown in the way such as “brother,” “sister,” 
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“cousin,” “distant cousin,” “same clan member,” “same ethnicity,” “same village 
resident,” “school mate,” or “no particular personal relations (before organization).”  
*** Please write years working with you in the same group/company.                     
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phenomena, such as the number of middle-sized formal enterprises and whether there 
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lack of linkage between imported and local technologies.     
2 By constitutional reform in 2010, districts were abolished and replaced by counties. 
However, the territory of the so-called Uasin Gishu did not change before or after the 
reform, though it had been divided into three districts before 2010. Therefore, ‘district’ 
and ‘county are used interchangeably here. 
3 It is clearly more than the natural population growth of Kenya (3.5 times during the 
same period), which reflects the large inflow of population, including settlers from 
other areas. 
4 One should take into consideration the fact that a substantial proportion of residents 
in Eldoret are students of large universities (over 30,000 students) such as Moi 
University and University of Eldoret. Even deducting this number of students, it is 
very likely that the Eldoret population had swollen by over ten times. Since graduates 
cannot necessarily find employment, many probably become unemployed or under 
employed.  
5 Accurate, detailed official statistics of population and employment in the city and 
suburbs are not available 
6 According to data provided by Michi-Bushin-Bito in September, 2016. 
7 Interviews with an executive in September 2014, and with an interviewee who was a 
director of the corporation which developed from Group A in September 2016.  
8 According to information by Michi-Bushin-Bito in September, 2016. 
9 Interview in September 2016 and February 2017. 
10 Another leader of Group A went to a polytechnic and obtained qualification as a civil 
engineer. 
11 The rank of another Group A leader was 28, which is not as good as the top leader. 
12 In government construction project contracts, a fixed percentage of sales tax is to be 
deducted by the government from payments to contractors. 
                                                   
